
DKW, October 21, 2010
FORTUNE -- Let us tell you an ugly truth about the economy, a truth that
no one in power or who aspires to power wants to share with you, at
least until after the midterm elections are over.
It's this: There is
nothing that the
From listening to what passes for public debate in our country, you'd
never know that. You'd think that the federal government could revive
the economy quickly if only Congress would let it be more aggressive
with stimulus spending. Or that the Fed could fix it if only it weren't
overly worried about touching off inflation. Or that the free market
could fix it if only we made deep and permanent tax cuts. Watch enough
cable TV, listen to enough talk radio, read enough blogs and columns,
and you'd think that they -- the bad guys -- are forcing the country to
suffer needlessly when a simple and painless solution to our problems is
at hand.
But if you look at
things rationally rather than politically, you'll see that
Heaven knows we
could use such a wondrous fix. Even though the Great Recession ended 16
months ago according to the business-cycle arbiters at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, that means only that the economy started to
grow in June 2009. It doesn't mean that the economy's healed. It
certainly doesn't mean that the recession's victims have healed. Tens of
millions of people are still economically wounded from declines in their
home values and investment accounts. Worse, despite some modest
employment growth we're down almost 8 million jobs from the end of 2007,
when the Great Recession officially began. Now, on to the real problems
in the economy: why they've been so resistant to the traditional cures
of lower interest rates and higher government spending. And we'll show
you that, when you talk to them in private (albeit on-the-record)
forums, people from across the political and economic spectrum agree
that there's no magic cure for what ails the economy.
The fact is that our
nation has suffered a huge financial trauma, in the double-digit
trillions, and it's going to take years to get well again. This isn't
exactly unknown in
For President Obama,
who campaigned on the promise of transformational change, it's been
especially tough medicine to deliver. Take his performance in a
September town hall session on CNBC. People in the audience were looking
for immediate solutions to their problems, and Obama seemed to struggle
with how to answer them. You can see why. Look what happened to the last
President who ran for reelection during bad economic times: George H.W.
Bush, in 1992. Bush came under fire for not doing more to help people
who lost their jobs in the recession that had started in 1990, and for
not showing more empathy in public. After losing to Bill "It's the
economy, stupid"
If you think Bush
had troubles, imagine what Obama is wrestling with. Today's economic
problems have proved enormously resistant to the traditional
rate-cutting cure Bush wanted "Maestro" Greenspan to order up. That's
because the Great Recession, whose aftermath we're living through, was
different from the 10 previous post-World War II recessions.
Those slowdowns were
caused by the Fed's raising short-term interest rates to combat
inflation. Recessions caused by the Fed's raising rates could be cured
by the Fed's lowering rates. If things looked especially dicey, the
federal government would send people checks to generate economic
activity and spur confidence.
Independent
but not all-powerful
But the Great
Recession was different: It was triggered by a financial meltdown
brought on by excessive lending, reckless risk taking, the implosion of
an unregulated shadow banking system that assumed that short-term money
would always be available -- and ignorant and careless borrowing by
people and institutions. The recession's genesis is why things are still
sluggish even though the Fed has cut short-term rates, which it
controls, to virtually zero, and has forced down long-term rates, which
it doesn't control, by buying more than $1 trillion of securities in the
open market, and letting it be known that it and other central banks
will buy more.
Yet although such
"quantitative easing" -- econo-speak for "printing money" -- helped
allay financial panic in 2009 by providing cash to institutions that
needed it badly, it's less effective and more risky to use it to
stimulate the economy. Hence the knife fight at the Fed board of
governors between the fans of
quantitative
easing and those opposing it.
Let us explain. Even
though the Fed is very powerful, it's not all-powerful, just as the
To its credit, the
Fed -- the one institution that because of its independence can actually
act quickly without making a political show -- sort of admits that its
power is limited. "Central bankers alone cannot solve the world's
economic problems," chairman Ben Bernanke
said in a
speech at the Fed's conclave in
The Fed wouldn't let
us interview Bernanke about the limits of the Fed's power. It's easy to
see why: He'd risk diminishing what remains of the Fed mystique by
talking on the record about limitations and problems.
However, former Fed
vice chairman Donald Kohn, a 40-year Fed veteran, agreed to discuss
those limits, provided we made it clear he was speaking for himself as
an outsider, not for the Fed. "The Federal Reserve can make a
difference, but it doesn't have a magic bullet," said Kohn. "It can't
take a weak economy facing a lot of major challenges and rapidly turn it
into a strong economy."
Kohn isn't alone in
that view. "The public has been sold this notion that somehow we can
control the economy -- that we can fine-tune it so we don't get
inflation on the upside, we don't get recessions on the downside, [that]
when something happens, they can step in and offset it," says another
long-time Washington insider, Douglas Holtz-Eakin. "The economics
profession is painfully aware that this is just not true, and [that it]
has a terrible impact on politicians, Presidents in particular."
Holtz-Eakin,
president of the American Action Forum, a conservative think tank, was
John McCain's economic adviser in the 2008 campaign. He and his
Democratic counterparts know the dirty little secret: that the huge
financial trauma suffered by the economy won't disappear overnight. "No
one has found a way to have an incredibly severe financial crisis and
snap back a year or two later," says Jason Furman, deputy director of
the White House's National Economic Council.
Look at the numbers
and you'll see why. The biggest single source of wealth for many people
-- their home equity -- has fallen almost 50% from its peak in 2006,
according to Federal Reserve statistics. Loss: $6.5 trillion.
People used to
collectively spend more than they took home -- hence, our negative
national savings rate, which was covered by borrowing. Now we're
spending 6% or so less than we're taking home. That's a big headwind to
fight. The switch from borrowers to savers augurs well for the long run,
if the trend lasts. But in the short run, it hurts the economy by
diminishing activity. Compared with all the losses we've talked about,
the $814 billion in stimulus spending -- the effectiveness of which we
won't get into today -- is small beer.
Many ideas but few
solutions
So what do you do?
One proposed solution is to jump-start the economy with deep and
permanent tax cuts. That's more than a little problematic, given that
the Great Recession began in 2007, when tax rates, especially on
investment income, were about the lowest in modern times and there were
no "Obama tax increases" on the horizon. George W. Bush had pushed
through two big tax cuts -- one in 2001 because the government was
supposedly taking in too much money, the second in 2003 to stimulate
investment. But the economy tanked anyway. The latest tax-cut screed,
the Republican party's Pledge to
What about having
the Treasury engage in a massive stimulus program to put money in
people's pockets and have them spend it, ginning up economic activity
and restoring confidence? But stimulus money has to come from somewhere
-- and it doesn't seem possible for the Treasury to raise a few trillion
more stimulus bucks without dire consequences to interest rates and the
dollar's value. It doesn't help that the administration wrongly
predicted that its stimulus package would hold unemployment to 8%; the
rate soared to 10% and still hangs stubbornly in the mid-nines. Other
institutions, such as the Fed and the Social Security Administration,
both nonpartisan, also underestimated our economic problems. But the
administration's mistake, which seems to have been an honest one, has
undermined its credibility. The fact that stimulus programs seemed
designed to favor unionized workers, a core Democratic constituency,
didn't help. Nor did the fact that
Cash for
Clunkers and the $8,000 credit for first-time homebuyers
caused one-time spikes in new-car and house sales, which fell off
sharply after the programs expired.
Our final little
secret is that the
Quantitative easing
comes with qualifiers
The closest we're
likely to come to free money is the Fed's proposed quantitative-easing
moves to buy Treasury securities. Let us show you how it works -- and
the problems with it. Let's say the Fed buys $1 trillion of Treasury
securities in the secondary market. Out of thin air, it creates $1
trillion in credit balances in the sellers' accounts. The sellers have
$1 trillion more cash than they did, increasing the money supply. There
is now $1 trillion less of publicly traded Treasuries, which props up
their price. By contrast, if Goldman Sachs wanted to buy $1 trillion of
Treasury securities, it would have to find $1 trillion of cash to pay
for them. Sellers would have $1 trillion more cash than before, Goldman
would have $1 trillion less. There would be no increase in the money
supply or decrease in the Treasury supply.
If the Fed could buy
endless amounts of Treasury securities without any side effects, it
would be almost like free money. The securities would cost the Treasury
little or nothing in the way of interest, because the Fed turns over its
profits -- $53 billion last year, $40 billion in the first half of 2010
-- to the Treasury. So if the Fed buys $1 trillion of 2.5%, 10-year
Treasury notes, Treasury's $25 billion annual interest expense is offset
by the $25 billion of extra profit the Fed would make, all (or almost
all) of which would be turned over to the Treasury. See? Isn't that
grand?
There is, however, a
problem. The Fed can't do that indefinitely without touching off
inflation, debasing the dollar, or both. Markets are bigger and more
powerful than the Fed. Consider the reaction of people like veteran Wall
Street value investor Hugh Lamle of M.D. Sass to quantitative easing.
"It's one thing to do $800 billion once," he says. "But if the federal
government is going to print $1 trillion a year for five years, maybe I
don't want to be in dollars." A second factor is that long-term rates
are already so low that it's not clear how much stimulus you get from
cutting them more. It's a big deal to cut interest rates to 5% from 8%.
But at lower levels, the result is less dramatic. Do you think the
difference between 3% and 2.5% is going to matter? Meanwhile, these
ultralow rates are penalizing American savers -- especially retirees
relying on CD income to supplement Social Security. They tend to spend
all their income, and it's down sharply. That's one reason the economy
is weak.
Don't get us wrong,
there are plenty of winners in this game -- just not the ones who need
help. Cash-rich corporations are issuing
billions of
dollars of cheap debt for purposes such as buying back stock
rather than expanding and creating new jobs. Corporations have record
cash on hand but aren't using it to expand in the U.S. Banks, too, are
profiting mightily from quantitative easing. They can borrow short-term
money for essentially nothing, then buy Treasury securities, knowing
that the Fed will support the securities' prices by buying them in the
market. Playing the yield curve is easier, less risky, and more
lucrative than what the government wants the banks to do: make loans.
How will Obama get things done?
Perhaps the biggest
problem we have standing in the way of having good times back is housing
-- which is an example of how deep-rooted our problems are and how
resistant to government programs. Housing was a major source of national
wealth for decades, and home equity, however sadly diminished, is still
the biggest single piece of wealth many Americans have. That's
especially true of lower-income people. No one shouts this from the
rooftops, but the federal government and the Fed are doing all they can
to prop up house prices. Thanks to the Fed's forcing down long-term
rates, fixed-rate mortgages are at record lows. Most of those mortgages
come via Uncle Sam. For the first half of the year, 89% of mortgages
came from the government-run Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing
Administration, and Veterans Administration, according to Inside
Mortgage Finance. That's almost triple the levels of housing's peak
years: 31% in 2005 and 30% in 2006.
Even with all that
effort, though, housing prices may be stabilizing at levels far below
their peak four years ago rather than recovering broadly.
When will house
prices get back to where they were? John Burns of John Burns Real Estate
Consulting, one of the nation's savviest real estate analysts, invokes
the seven-and-seven rule. In previous local-market bubbles, Burns says,
"the rule of thumb is seven years down and seven years up" after the
bubble pops. Apply that rule to the national market, where the bubble
popped in 2006, and we're talking about a sustained recovery starting in
2013, and taking until 2020. That's pretty grim, but probably realistic.
So when are we going
to know when things are getting better? They may, in fact, be getting
better now, but it's going to take a long time for the wound to heal
completely. We need to take care of people who have lost their jobs and
lost their hope. But after the midterm elections, when there's going to
be immense pressure to adopt everyone's programs, we can't just throw
money at everything, searching for magic cures and magic sound bites. If
we do, it will take us that much longer to climb out of the hole.
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